This led Davidson (z.B 1986) to assert that most of our convictions are true – a conclusion that is well in line with the theory of the coherence of truth. This is a weaker statement than the neoclassical theory of coherence would. It does not emphasize that all members of a coherent belief are true or that the truth is simply to be a member of such a coherent sentence. Nevertheless, the conclusion that most of our beliefs are true, because their content must be understood by a radical process of interpretation that will make it a coherent and rational system, has a clear affinity with the theory of neoclassical coherence. Beginning in the mid-19th century, this line of criticism led some philosophers to focus on great theories rather than successive sentences or assertions. From this point of view, truth must be a feature of the whole body of faith, which is considered a system of logically interconnected components – the so-called « Web of Faith. » It could be, for example, a physical theory that deserves to stop by making predictions or allowing people to control things, or by simplifying and standardizing separate phenomena. An individual belief in such a system is true if it is sufficiently consistent with other beliefs or if it is rational enough; Alternatively, a belief system is true if it is sufficiently internally coherent. These were the views of British idealists, including F.H. Bradley and H.H. Joachim, who, like all idealists, refused the existence of facts independent of the mind, against which the truth of convictions could be determined (see also realism: realism and truth). It is easy to launch this platitude in a way that seems wrong. Certainly, many speakers do not aim to say anything true.

Not all lying speakers do. Any speaker whose purpose is to flatter or deceive is for something other than truth. It should be noted that the starting point of deflationary (5), which lends itself to deflating excisions, is in fact wrong in the theory of correspondence. After (5), depending on the fact that the white snow is sufficient and necessary for « snow is white » to be true. But after (1) and (2), it is sufficient, but not necessary: « Snow is white » will be true as long as it corresponds to one or the other fact. The original article (1) or (2) is not as easy to empty as the scammer (5). To illustrate the theory, look at the German phrase « snow is white, » which means the snow is white. Tarski wonders about the conditions of truth of the sentence expressed by this sentence: « Under what conditions is this sentence true? » In other words: « How are we going to complete the following in English: « The phrase expressed by the German phrase « Snow is white » is true… His answer: Proponents of the theory of redundancy respond that their theory recognizes the essential point of needing the concept of truth for indirect reference.